University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
CSE Conference and Workshop Papers

Computer Science and Engineering, Department of

2015

Remote Mobile Screen (RMS): an approach for
secure BYOD environments
Santiago Gimenez Ocano
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, gimenez@cse.unl.edu

Byrav Ramamurthy
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, bramamurthy2@unl.edu

Yong Wang
Dakota State University, yong.wang@dsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cseconfwork
Gimenez Ocano, Santiago; Ramamurthy, Byrav; and Wang, Yong, "Remote Mobile Screen (RMS): an approach for secure BYOD
environments" (2015). CSE Conference and Workshop Papers. 238.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cseconfwork/238

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Computer Science and Engineering, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in CSE Conference and Workshop Papers by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

2015 International Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications, Communications and Information Security
Symposium

Pages: 52 - 56, DOI: 10.1109/ICCNC.2015.7069314

Remote Mobile Screen (RMS): an approach for
secure BYOD environments
Santiago Gimenez Ocano∗ , Byrav Ramamurthy∗
∗ Department

of Computer Science & Engineering,
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588 USA
Email: {gimenez,byrav}@cse.unl.edu

Yong Wang†

College of Business and Information Systems,
Dakota State University, Madison, SD 57042 USA
Email: yong.wang@dsu.edu

In order to prevent these vulnerabilities, a BYOD solution
must achieve the following goals:
• Space isolation, by separating the corporate’s space from
the employee’s space so that different security policies
can be enforced.
• Corporate data protection, by employing encryption and
rejecting unauthorized access.
• Security policy enforcement, where the mobile device
complies with the corporation’s security policies.
• True isolation, where the corporate’s data is not located
on the BYOD device.
• Non-intrusive, meaning that any software installed in the
mobile device must not need any special privilege that
might allow it to monitor the behavior of the user on his
or her device.
• Non-resource-intensive, as mobile devices are resourceconstrained and do not have much spare resources for
demanding applications.
The ﬁrst three requirements were identiﬁed by Wang et al.
[1]. They are necessary, but they are not sufﬁcient. Encryption
does not guarantee corporate data protection, as the data is
still located in the device and the protection mechanism can
be foiled. Moreover, these goals only consider the enterprise
perspective, without contemplating the employee’s needs. To
overcome these ﬂaws we introduce the last three goals.
In this paper we introduce Remote Mobile Screen (RMS),
an approach that addresses the desired goals in order to provide
a secure BYOD environment.

Abstract—The introduction of bring your own device (BYOD)
policy in the corporate world creates beneﬁts for companies as
well as job satisfaction for the employee. However, it also creates
challenges in terms of security as new vulnerabilities arise. In
particular, these challenges include space isolation, data conﬁdentiality, and policy compliance as well as handling the resource
constraints of mobile devices and the intrusiveness created by
installed applications seeking to perform BYOD functions. We
present Remote Mobile Screen (RMS), an approach for secure
BYOD environments that addresses all these challenges. In order
to achieve this, the enterprise provides the employee with a
trusted virtual machine running a mobile operating system,
which is located in the enterprise network and to which the
employee connects using the mobile BYOD device. We describe
our proposed solution and discuss our experimental results.
Finally, we discuss advantages and disadvantages of RMS and
possible future work.
Index Terms—Bring your own device (BYOD), data conﬁdentiality, policy enforcement, security, space isolation, virtualization.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Smartphones, tablets and phablets have become key elements in the workplace, as they increase the productivity of
the employees. However, the use of these devices has created
inconveniences for companies as they must take care of the
costs associated with obtaining and maintaining such devices.
On top of that, the speed with which new technologies are introduced make these devices obsolete in a short period of time,
and employees often want to choose their devices themselves.
As a result, companies adapted to this new scenario by using
a policy called Bring Your Own Device (BYOD), where each
employee provides his or her own mobile device as needed.
The advantages of BYOD, also known as dual-use devices, are
clear. On the one hand, employees increase their productivity
and job satisfaction. On the other hand, companies save the
costs of purchasing and maintaining such assets.
However, there is concern related to employee’s privacy,
as companies might monitor the personal data saved in the
devices. From the company perspective, the worries are bigger
as mobile devices connect to the corporate network, increasing
the chances of cyber attacks. As Wang et al. [1] mention, as
employees own the BYOD devices, they are vulnerable to data
leakage, unauthorized sharing of data space between employee
and corporation, and lack of security policy compliance.
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II. R ELATED W ORK
Recent research studies have covered BYOD, providing
classiﬁcations and solutions. We categorize these solutions into
agent-based, cloud-based, Mobile Virtual Machine (MVM),
framework and Trusted Execution Environment (TEE).
Leavitt [2] elaborates on Mobile Device Management
(MDM) and Mobile Application Management (MAM). They
are agent-based because an application must be installed in
the employee’s device to allow the enterprise to lock down,
control, encrypt and enforce policies. With an MDM, the
enterprise can control the behavior, data, and applications
installed in the BYOD device; while an MAM only focuses
on managing applications. Companies such as VMware, IBM,
MacAfee and SAP offer agent-based solutions. This type
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of solutions provides policy enforcement, and might provide
isolation, but the corporate’s data is stored in the device. The
agent installed is intrusive as it requires special permissions.
Leavitt [2] also elaborates on cloud-based solutions, which
rely on cloud storage to provide mobile access to data and
applications. They create space isolation but once the data is
downloaded, data isolation is lost. Additionally, they do not
offer policy enforcement.
Wang et al. [1] discuss the use of Mobile Virtual Machine
(MVM). They separate spaces in the mobile device, as they
can use one Operating System (OS) for the user and another
for the enterprise. There are two types of virtual machines for
mobile phones: heavy duty and simpliﬁed lightweight. The
former allows the user to install multiple OSs, while the latter
needs less resources but it does not allow the user to install
multiple OSs. Russello et al. [3] developed MOSES, a policybased framework for enforcing software and data isolation on
the Android platform, using a lightweight approach. Andrus
et al. [4] present Cells, a lightweight Virtual Machine (VM)
architecture for mobile phones based on Android. MVMs
are resource-intensive for constraint-based mobile devices and
do not allow an automatic policy enforcement. Further, they
cannot be implemented in a BYOD environment because it is
impossible to modify the device without being intrusive to the
employee.
Frameworks are solutions that include components in the
device and the enterprise side. Titze et al. [5] propose a
Security Service Architecture (SSA) for security checks of
smartphones that replicates the employee’s smartphone on the
enterprise side and analyzes it to ﬁnd security ﬂaws. Chung
et al. [6] developed 2TAC, which addresses access issues by
using a double layer access control (one at the device and
the other in the cloud) along with device security proﬁles,
anti-virus/malware scanners, and social networking. Wang et
al. [1] propose a BYOD Security Framework (BSF), which
we describe in detail at the end of this section. Cisco offers
BYOD Smart Solution [7], which focuses on the infrastructure
of the network and provides policy management, mobility and
applications, while supporting MDMs from third parties. The
disadvantages with all these frameworks are that they install
an intrusive application in the employee’s device, and they
allow corporate data to be stored in the devices.
Ekberg et al. [8] discuss TEEs, which separates the execution of an application into secure and insecure parts by using a
protected area in the processor. Zhao and Osono [9] developed
TrustDroid, an Android application that analyzes other applications, to prevent them from accessing the corporate data.
TEE provides space isolation but data can be stored in the
mobile device and it does not offer policy enforcement.

policies from the SPD. Additionally, there is a BYOD side
where isolation is present by implementing an MVM. In the
corporate space, there is an MDM agent that enforces the
security policies in the corporate data. The corporate space
includes cryptographic primitives that make the enterprise’s
data conﬁdential to non-enterprise actions. This framework
provides data protection, isolation and policy enforcement, but
at the expense of installing an MVM and an MDM agent in
the BYOD device.
III. R EMOTE M OBILE S CREEN (RMS): D ESCRIPTION
Below, we describe our solution, Remote Mobile Screen
(RMS) which addresses the challenges of BYOD security.
A. Architecture
RMS modiﬁes BSF [1] by moving the corporate space
inside the enterprise network, adding a new element called
Corporate Space Manager (CSM) and using the VNC protocol
(based on the RFB protocol [10]) to allow the user to access
the enterprise space. Just as in BSF [1], RMS presents a BYOD
side and an enterprise side, which are described as follows.
1) BYOD side: Compared to the BSF [1], this part of
the architecture is simpler. The mobile device only contains
the personal data and applications of the user. The only
requirement is that one of these applications must be a VNC
client used to access the enterprise space, located in the
corporate network. Part (A) of Figure 1 shows this side.
The novelty of our architecture relies on the way the
employee access the corporate resources. In order to access
the resources, the employee must use a VNC client found in
a app store. But then the user does not access a desktop OS
(i.e. Windows, Linux, Mac OS X) but a Mobile OS (MOS)
(i.e. Android, iOS). This addresses the poor level of usability
that desktop OSs have when they are accessed from a BYOD
device, as they are not designed to be scaled for small screens
nor implement gestures customary to an MOS. Consequently,
when the employee accesses the enterprise side, he or she is
presented with an interface designed for mobile devices. To
our understanding, the concept of a mobile device that access
a MOS has not been used in BYOD environments, or for any
other kind of purpose.
(A) BYOD device
Personal Space
Personal Data

(B) Enterprise Network
Corporate Resources

Host OS
Corp. Space: Guest OS

Servers

VNC Server

Corp. App.

Corp. App.

VNC Client

Empl. App.

Empl. App.

Sec. Policy
Enforcement

Internet

Corp.
Data

Security Policy Database

A. BYOD Security Framework
Corp. Space Manager

In this framework, proposed by Wang et al. [1], there
is an enterprise side that includes the corporate’s resources,
a Security Policy Database (SPD), an MDM, as well as a
Network Access Control (NAC) that separates requests coming
from the personal space or corporate space based on the

Network Access Control

Fig. 1: Diagram of the architecture of RMS.
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TABLE I: Comparison between the different type of solutions.

2) Enterprise Side: Since this side does not suffer from
limitations in terms of resources as a mobile device does, it is
composed of most of the elements in the RMS architecture.
Corporate resources, NAC and SPD perform the same roles
as the ones described in BSF. The ﬁrst one is the group of
resources that the company has, such as e-mail servers, web
servers, gateways to the Internet, etc., while NAC is in charge
of authorizing and rejecting access to the resources from inside
and outside of the corporate network by relying on the policies
located in the SPD.
On the enterprise side, depicted in Part (B) of Figure 1, we
ﬁnd the corporate space. This space is an MOS running as the
guest OS of a VM. In this OS, a VNC server is installed and
conﬁgured in such a way that the user can access the enterprise
space using a VNC client in his or her BYOD device. In
addition, to comply with the enterprise policies, the corporate
space has a security policy enforcement entity.
Our Corporate Space Manager (CSM) is in charge of
managing all the enterprise spaces, by creating, starting and
stopping MOSs in the VM, providing elasticity to the architecture. CSM operates as a proxy server, since it inspects the
content of VNC packets and performs actions based on such
content. In order to decide to create or start an existing MOS,
it must keep track of which MOS is assigned to each user.
Further, it must add and remove NAT entries in the VM so
that messages get forwarded to the corresponding MOS.
Consequently, by installing the VNC application, the user
can access the corporate resources just as if he or she were
using an MVM installed in the BYOD device, but without
affecting its resources. The client application is in charge of
the visualization of the of the guest OS screen, and of taking
the gestures from the client and sending them to the guest OS.




True Isolation












Non Resource
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Non-intrusive



Corporate Data
Protection

Type
agent-based
cloud-based
MVM
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framework
framework
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TEE
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RMS is a non-intrusive solution that does not require the
amount of resources that an MVM needs. The employee only
needs to install a VNC client available in the app store of
the mobile device’s platform. Such clients do not require
administrative resources as MDM agents do. In addition, the
enterprise does not need to provide support to the BYOD at
all, since there is no software installed by the corporation.
Another beneﬁt is the fact that RMS is platform-agnostic,
as it can provide service to every mobile platform that has a
VNC client application. BYOD devices can be changed by
the employees without consulting the enterprise, providing
ﬂexibility and exploiting one of the main reasons why BYOD
policies were implemented. Further, the employee does not
need to allocate storage space on his or her device for the
corporate data and work-related applications.
Finally, in Table I we provide a comparison table of all
types of solutions for BYOD and the goals that they achieve.
It can be seen that RMS achieve all desired goals.

B. Features of RMS
RMS achieves all the desired goals for a secure BYOD
environment. It provides separation of spaces by implementing
the corporate space in the enterprise network while leaving the
personal space at the mobile device. This produces true isolation, since both spaces are never shared either in the BYOD
device nor in the MOS. Data conﬁdentiality is guaranteed
since, even if the employee loses the device, the corporate
data remains always in the enterprise network. This means that
there is no data leakage and no unauthorized access. Further,
the use of NAC and CSM provides a strict control of the
information’s ﬂow between both spaces.
Security policy enforcement and data protection are easily
achieved since the user does not control the MOS. The enterprise can enforce the use of policies by using an MDM agent
in the MOS. For example, instead of installing applications
from the Internet in the guest OS, the user is offered a curated, authorized list of applications allowed by the company.
Furthermore, the enterprise can decide which permissions
an employee can have in the corporate space. There is an
additional advantage; instead of focusing the security efforts
on every mobile device, RMS concentrates all the security
efforts on a single point in the corporate’s network.

IV. I MPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS
A. Implementation
We developed a proof-of-concept implementation. For supporting the MOS we used VirtualBox [11] that hosts AndroVM
[12] as a guest. Since virtual machine platforms use x86
architecture, the MOS must use the same architecture. As
an alternative to AndroVM, we have also tested Androidx86 [13], a port of Android for the desired architecture. The
VNC server used is Droid VNC server [14] modiﬁed for the
x86 architecture. Finally, for VNC clients, we have employed
VNC Lite, VNC Viewer and TinyVNC. Figure 2 shows our
implementation, where AndroVM is displayed on the screen
of an Apple iPhone 5s running iOS 7 and a Samsung Focus
with Windows Phone 7.
B. Scalability
The framework we propose permits one employee per guest
OS. The resources needed allow for a single server with
standard conﬁguration to run several guest OSs, providing
service to several employees. Moreover, the VM software has
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Two instances of
AndroVM running
on the same server

Fig. 4: CPU usage and number of threads vs. number of MOSs
Apple iPhone
(iOS)

Samsung Focus
(Windows Phone)

Fig. 2: Implementation of RMS using different devices.

Fig. 5: Virtual memory, used memory and swap memory vs.
number of MOSs

presents a linear behavior, as 24 of them are added by each
MOS. On the other, the CPU load presents a linear behavior
until the maximum number of MOS is reached, when it
reaches 100% of use. This effect is because there is not enough
RAM memory in the system to support all the MOSs and the
CPU must perform paging more frequently.
3) Memory usage: To analyze memory usage, we gathered information of virtual memory, used memory and swap
memory. Figure 5 illustrates these indicators. Virtual memory
remains constant until the used memory reaches 8GB. At this
point, the virtual memory increases its value by incrementing
the size of the swap memory.
Consequently, based on the discussion related to scalability
and the results of our experiments, we can conclude that RMS
scales very well with the number of users.

Fig. 3: Boot time vs. number of MOSs

the feature of saving a machine state instead of turning it off,
while releasing resources at the same time. This saves unused
resources for other employees and provides a fast start after
the employee has disconnected and re-connects.
C. Experimental results
To test the scalability and performance of RMS, our experiment consisted of ﬁnding the maximum amount of MOSs that
the server can support before crashing. The server hardware
includes a 1.3GHz dual-core Intel Core i5 CPU, 8GB of
1600MHz LPDDR3 RAM and a 128 GB ﬂash drive. The
experiment consisted of starting one MOS after the other
until such a limit was achieved. We measured the time taken
for each of these OSs to boot up, as well as checked the
performance by measuring the CPU load, the number of
threads, and different parameters related to memory usage.
1) Boot time: Even though AndroVM requests 1GB of
RAM memory, the MOS needed 540 MB. This allowed us
to run 18 MOSs without affecting the booting time. Such a
behavior can be seen in Figure 3, where the booting time is on
average 13 seconds until the 19th instance of MOS, when the
boot time reached around 55 seconds. The system continued
working but after 2 minutes and 40 seconds, the server crashed.
2) CPU usage: Figure 4 shows the response of the CPU
load and the number of threads as a function of the number
of MOSs. As expected both indicators increase as the number
of MOSs increases. On the one hand, the number of threads

V. D ISCUSSION
In this section we discuss how RMS can beneﬁt from the
migrating it to the Cloud, provide a security analysis and list
the disadvantages of RMS.
A. The Cloud
The natural evolution in RMS is to migrate the enterprise
side to the cloud, as it addresses concerns related to latency,
scalability, and availability.
First, since the Cloud is composed of several datacenters
distributed across the world, the employee will likely be close
to one, making the latency minimal. Further, architectures like
the ones presented in MobilityFirst [15] propose a contentaware network, where the ﬁrst-hop router stores all the data
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needed by the user and, when the user roams to other networks,
the data is migrated to remain close to the user.
Second, RMS beneﬁts from elastic computing, as the Cloud
adapts to the needs of the employees dynamically by activating
and disabling guest OSs on-demand.
Finally, the use of distributed datacenters provides redudancy against failure that guarantees continuous service to the
employee. Even if the entire datacenter is unavailable, another
datacenter can be used at the expense of higher latency.

the sufﬁcient goals that a secure BYOD solution must achieve.
A classiﬁcation of the current solutions for BYOD has been
presented, summarizing which goals they meet and showing
that currently there is no solution that can achieve all of
them. We proposed a new architecture for BYOD solutions,
Remote Mobile Screen (RMS). We provided a description
of RMS, discussed its features, disadvantages and describe
its implementation. We have presented additional thoughts
on scalability, showed the results of our experiments and
discussed how to evolve RMS by migrating it to the Cloud.
Future work involves developing a CSM as well as performing a study on latency. In addition we plan to address
usability issues such as support for mobile gestures that were
not discussed in this paper. Further, we expect to analyze the
adoption of RMS by users, by providing them access to our
testbeds and by gathering feedback with a survey.

B. Security Analysis
We have identiﬁed a set of threats that affect the security of
our framework. First, the VNC protocol lacks an acceptable
level of security, and it must run on top a VPN protocol [10].
Second, this protocol allows sharing the clipboard and ﬁles
between the client and the server. Disabling the features
from the server side can prevent both situations, isolating the
clipboard at each space and preventing ﬁle-sharing between the
spaces. Another approach is to allow the ﬂow of information
between spaces only in one direction, meaning that an employee can only upload ﬁles to the server, or send information
from the user’s clipboard to the server’s clipboard.
Third, there might be situations where the content of
the screen of the BYOD device is captured, i.e. by taking
screenshots of the device’s screen or shoulder surﬁng. There
is no solution to prevent this since company does not have
any intrusive software installed in the mobile device. The
alternative against this threat is user education.
Finally, Denial of Service is an important threat. If employees cannot access the corporate space, they will suffer
from work disruption. These problems are addressed by using
redundancy of single points of failures and backing up data.
For RMS, the NAC and the CSM must have a fail-over system
and the MOSs must be frequently backed up.
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C. Disadvantages of RMS
In order to access the corporate network, the employee must
have connectivity, with an acceptable amount of delay. These
two issues are part of the trade-off that RMS creates in order to
achieve all the goals needed in a secure BYOD environment.
These drawbacks are discussed as follows.
1) Latency: We deﬁne latency as the time between the
user’s input and the response obtained from the client application. Just like another real-time application, RMS will suffer
from latency-related issues. In general, the farther away the
user is from the corporate resources, the bigger the latency.
2) Connectivity: The mobile device relies heavily on continuous connectivity. Without it the employee cannot perform
work actions such as saving an e-mail draft to send it later.
Our argument is that the disadvantages that RMS presents
can be either overcome or accepted, as the beneﬁts that the
company obtains are greater than the drawbacks.
VI. C ONCLUSION AND F UTURE W ORK
In this paper we have described the security challenges that
BYOD faces. We have listed the necessary goals as well as
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